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The rise of China is not a new phenomenon. The PRC’s growing eco-
nomic (and in a number of cases also political) involvement in Southeast 
Asia and particularly in sub-Saharan Africa has caught the attention of 
academics and policymakers alike. However, China’s emergence as an 
important actor in Latin America has only recently appeared on the radar 
screen of the scholarly community and is still an under-researched area. 
Eight years have passed since Chinese President Hu Jintao’s first tour of 
Latin America in November 2004, marking the beginning of a new phase 
in Beijing’s trans-Pacific relations. The significant boost in Chinese–Latin 
American trade provides strong evidence for the importance of this 
emerging pattern of interaction. China’s trade with the region reached 
180 billion USD in 2010, evincing not only an increase of 50 per cent 
from 2009 but also a pattern of sharp growth since 2000, when the Chi-
na–Latin America trade volume stood at just 13 billion USD. By 2007 
bilateral trade had already exceeded Hu’s original target of 100 billion 
USD, set for 2010 (China Daily 2011; Xinhua 2008). The articles in this 
issue of the Journal of Current Chinese Affairs bear strong witness to the fact 
that this budding relationship has been driven mainly by a mutual desire 
to accelerate economic exchange.  
At the same time, economic relations go substantially beyond trade, 
and are also perhaps more visibly characterised by the often successful 
attempts of Chinese state-owned corporations (such as PetroChina and 
Sinopec) to acquire shares in Latin American oil and mineral commodi-
ties exploration companies. On the political side, Beijing’s involvement 
in the Western hemisphere has materialised in the establishment of so-
called “strategic partnerships” with several states in the region; China’s 
training of increasing numbers of Latin American military personnel; and 
attempts to expand the ties of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) with 
political parties across the continent. These examples of the intensifying 
Sino-Latin American links seemingly support a neorealist perspective 
according to which Beijing uses trade, investment, development aid and 
diplomacy in an attempt to balance the regional and global dominance of 
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the United States and other OECD nations. Li (2008: 195) argues that 
China is taking advantage of a power vacuum in the region that was cre-
ated by the United States’ and Russia’s declining interest in Latin Ameri-
ca. 
Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) reached approximately 15 
billion USD in Latin America and the Caribbean in 2010, representing 9 
per cent of the region’s total FDI.1 More than 90 per cent has been in-
vested in natural resource extraction. The main recipient countries were 
Brazil, Argentina and Peru. China has established itself as the third-
largest investor in the region, behind the United States and the Nether-
lands. Royal Dutch Shell has traditionally been one of the largest inves-
tors in Latin America, and in 2010 the relative position of the Nether-
lands was further strengthened by Heineken’s acquisition of Mexico’s 
FEMSA brewery. Until 2009, Chinese FDI had barely registered. While 
the US still provides the biggest percentage of FDI in the region, ac-
counting for 17 per cent of the 113 billion USD in 2010, the gap is grad-
ually narrowing (ECLAC 2011). During Chinese Vice-President Xi 
Jinping’s “low-key Latin American tour” of Chile, Uruguay and Cuba in 
June 2011, several agreements were signed that not only strengthen Chi-
na’s access to Chilean copper and Uruguayan soy but also cemented 
Beijing’s role in the development of Cuban oil, including Cuba’s soon-to-
be-explored fields in the Gulf of Mexico (Iturrieta 2011). This is only the 
latest in a series of events that have not gone unnoticed by Washington. 
President Barack Obama’s visit to Latin America in March 2011, his first 
trip to the region in almost two years, has widely been interpreted as an 
attempt to reassert US economic leadership in the region that Washing-
ton has traditionally dominated. It was no coincidence that Obama used 
the occasion to showcase Chile, which has thrived on the “Washington 
Consensus”. Yet, the success story and any superiority of the US-backed 
model of market reform can no longer be taken for granted. 
Fernández Jilberto and Hogenboom see clear parallels in the Chi-
nese and Latin American approaches to economic development:  

1 The FDI figures provided by ECLAC are much lower than in other reports be-
cause they exclude large sums of FDI in the region which reportedly are destined 
for off-shore financial havens (such as the Cayman Islands and the Virgin Islands), 
which are then to be reinvested in China (thereby taking advantage of tax breaks 
for “foreign companies”). For example, according to PRC official data, Latin 
America had received 22 billion USD in cumulative PRC investment by the end of 
2006. When the tax havens were excluded, only approximately 1.9 billion USD re-
mained (Lum et al. 2009: 12-13). 
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As a result of many leftist governments in Latin America, an interest-
ing pragmatic convergence with China has come about: The state is 
granted an important role in the economy (again) […]. China and Lat-
in America have both been moving in the direction of a development 
model in which there is reconciliation of state and market (Fernández 
Jilberto and Hogenboom 2010: 191).  
Have China and Latin America become natural bedfellows? Is the so-
called Beijing Consensus replacing the Washington Consensus? Do Latin 
American governments play the China card to hedge against Washing-
ton? How does involvement with the PRC impact the domestic condi-
tions in individual Latin American countries? These are some of the 
questions that this article and the subsequent contributions to this edi-
tion of the Journal of Current Chinese Affairs address. This essay begins with 
a brief overview of the history of China–Latin America relations before 
delving into China’s rise as an economic power in the region and the 
potential implications of this for the role of the US. Then follow some 
brief comments on the idea of a “China model” and an overview of the 
main arguments made by the authors in this thematic issue.  
%
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The earliest contact between Latin America and Asia was the Spanish 
colonisation of the Philippines in the second half of the sixteenth centu-
ry. The enormous increase in output of the silver mines in Spanish 
America in the 1570s began to have an effect on Asia. Some of the silver 
was carried directly to Manila from Acapulco and New Spain’s western 
ports to buy Southeast Asian spices and Chinese goods that had travelled 
south. This sea trading route existed for more than two centuries before 
the Spanish Pacific fleet ceased its service in 1815. According to Chinese 
accounts, contacts between the two continents pre-date even the Spanish 
empire and go back to Chinese expeditions reaching the American con-
tinent as early as the fifth century. 
In his bestselling book 1421: The Year China Discovered America, for-
mer British naval officer Gavin Menzies claimed the expeditions of Chi-
nese seafarer Zheng He (1371–1433) in the first half of the fifteenth 
century reached as far as America and circumvented the globe. While the 
admiral’s fleet undoubtedly visited the east coast of Africa as part of a 
series of seven naval expeditions sponsored by the Ming rulers, no hard 
evidence has ever emerged for Zheng’s travels to the Western hemi-
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sphere. The story is nevertheless a powerful element of Chinese folklore 
and appears to have become part of the state discourse of the PRC, es-
pecially in its dealings with Southeast Asia, and more recently with Africa 
and Latin America on the back of Menzies’s work (Goodman 2006) – a 
strange sleight of hand when there is actually a recorded history of trade 
between China and the New World, and of Spanish explorers from New 
Spain exploring the Chinese coast.  
Fast forward to the Cold War era and the ideologically motivated 
and balance of power-driven encounter between East Asia and Latin 
America prominently associated with, first, the Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM) and, second, the dynamics of Sino-American and Sino-Soviet 
relations. While it was Argentine President Juan Domingo Perón who 
pioneered the principles of non-alignment and peaceful coexistence 
within the context of the “Third Position” ideology, Latin America never 
quite managed to match the influence of Asia in the NAM. Only in Fidel 
Castro did the continent have a protagonist rivalling the status of Nehru 
in India or Sukarno in Indonesia within the movement that was de facto 
inaugurated by the Bandung Conference in 1955 and institutionalised at 
the Belgrade summit meeting in 1961. But Castro was also Latin Ameri-
ca’s dilemma: The position of members from the Western hemisphere – 
with Bolivia, Brazil and Mexico being the most active in the early 1960s 
– had been made more difficult to pin down due to Cuban ambiguity 
about what non-alignment meant and because of Castro’s refusal to re-
nounce the advocacy of revolution (Calvert 1994: 212–213). This posi-
tion, in turn, and the Cuban revolution in general, opened up a window 
of opportunity for Mao’s China. In the early 1960s, the motivation of the 
Chinese leadership to include Latin America in its foreign policy, albeit 
in a distant third position behind Asia and Africa, was mainly linked to 
Beijing’s anti-US stance and the quest to counter Washington’s economic 
blockade and political hostility (Xu 1994: 151). 
China showed great interest in Castro’s rise and hoped to see the 
emergence of the Cuban Revolution as a model for other parts of the 
region. However, China’s flirtation with communist parties and move-
ments made an only very limited impression in Central and South Amer-
ica (Lawrance 1975: 152). Once the Sino-Soviet split had escalated into 
full-scale political and military antagonism towards the end of the 1950s, 
“China began to discard political biases, distance itself from radical 
movements and guerrilla bands, and develop relations with established 
national governments in Latin America” in an attempt to secure more 
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support for its international position (Xu 1994: 152). There was little 
choice: Anti-communism prevailed for the better part of the Cold War in 
most Latin American states, particularly those ruled by right-wing mili-
tary dictatorships, leaving Beijing little room to make diplomatic advanc-
es (Phillips 2010: 178-179).  
The Kissinger and Nixon visits to China in 1971–72 eventually 
paved the way for pragmatic and issues-oriented relations between Bei-
jing and Latin American capitals, free of any ideological ballast. By the 
end of the decade, China had established diplomatic relations with most 
major Latin American states, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico 
and Peru. Chinese–Latin American relations in the 1970s and 1980s were 
predominantly politically motivated and were driven by quid pro quo 
strategies. For example, most Latin American governments voted in 
favour of granting China entry into the United Nations, while Beijing 
supported Latin American claims for 200-mile territorial sea limits in the 
Law of the Sea negotiations. 
A core strategic issue in this context is the Taiwan factor. The dip-
lomatic isolation of Taiwan has been perhaps the highest-ranking key 
political objective for the PRC in Latin America, where Beijing and Tai-
bei have competed fiercely with each other, mobilising extensive diplo-
matic and economic resources to hold their camps together (Teng 2007: 
102). Currently, only 23 national governments maintain diplomatic rela-
tions with Taiwan; 11 of them are in Latin America, including some 
small Caribbean nations. The most recent state (2007) to switch diplo-
matic relations from Taiwan to the PRC was Costa Rica, marking a par-
ticularly serious setback for Taibei. Central America plays a key role in 
Taiwan’s quest for international recognition because it is one of the few 
regions where the country is welcome as an official member of interna-
tional organisations. Taiwan is a non-regional member of the System of 
Central American Integration (SICA) and the Central American Bank of 
Economic Integration (BCIE) and was granted observer status at the 
Central American Parliament (Aguilera Peralta 2010: 171).  
In a similar vein, the PRC’s strategic objectives in Latin America are 
directed toward fostering cooperation in the political-strategic field in 
order to develop joint strategies in international forums. In UN organisa-
tions, Argentina and China often share positions regarding key matters 
on both countries’ foreign agendas.  Following a quid pro quo approach, 
Argentina has abstained from voting on the US-sponsored resolutions to 
investigate China’s human rights situation, while the PRC has continu-
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ously supported Argentina’s position on the Islas Malvinas (Falkland 
Islands) in the UN Committee on Decolonalisation. Furthermore, in 
2005 the two governments agreed to take a common stance against the 
US and EU agriculture subsidies at the WTO summit in Hong Kong 
(Olivia 2010: 105, 112).  According to Henrique Altemani de Oliveira 
(2010: 42), a strategic partnership between Brazil and China has emerged 
in the field of scientific and technological cooperation with the objective 
of breaking “the monopoly held by developed nations”. In 2010, China 
overtook the US as Brazil’s biggest trade partner with a volume of more 
than 56 billion USD. 
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Looking back at past decades of Chinese–Latin American encounters, 
there can be little doubt that general foreign policy and geostrategic con-
cerns, along with ideological considerations, preceded economic inter-
ests. Bilateral trade and investment in China’s relations with most Latin 
American countries was insignificant until well into the 1990s. It was 
Japan, not China, that spearheaded the development of substantial eco-
nomic links between East Asia and Latin America. The eventual failure 
of import substitution in Latin America and the concurrent success of 
East Asian economies with outward and more market-oriented policies 
in the 1980s and 1990s led Latin America to look to East Asia as a 
source of stimulation if not a model. The so-called “Asian Miracle” is 
even said to have contributed to Latin America’s shift toward more 
openness in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s (Edwards 1995; 
Tussie 2004; Kay 2002). By the early 1990s Japan had established itself as 
the second-largest trade partner of most Latin American economies and 
Tokyo had become the largest lender to Latin America, both bilaterally 
and through its contributions to international financial institutions 
(Stallings and Horisaka 1994: 126). 
However, the more that other Asian states took an interest in Latin 
America, the weaker Japan’s economic and political status became, and 
the country’s relations with the region declined starting in the late 1990s. 
Japan accounted for 11.4 per cent of Latin America’s total trade in 1990. 
By 2005 this statistic had reduced to 6.5 per cent, whereas other Asian 
countries showed a rapid increase from 7.6 per cent to 22.5 per cent 
(Rose 2010). South Korea benefitted in particular, as Asian firms were 
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looking “for new frontiers beyond the increasingly conflictive industrial 
markets of the US and Europe” (Kim 2004: 5).  
Free trade agreements (FTAs) have been signed between Japan and 
Mexico; Japan and Peru; Chile and Korea; and Peru and Thailand, re-
spectively. A preferential trade agreement (PTA) has come into effect 
between India and MERCOSUR (Common Market of the Cono Sur, 
grouping Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay). A number of bilat-
eral arrangements are also being explored between various Asian coun-
tries (Japan, Korea and Singapore) and Latin American countries (Brazil, 
Chile and Mexico). However, it was China’s charm offensive of the early 
twenty-first century – which saw an initial peak with President Hu 
Jintao’s first tour of Latin America in 2004 (his visit made a much 
stronger impact than that of his predecessor Jiang Zemin in 2001) along 
with increasing levels of diplomatic and economic activity –  that has 
captured everyone’s imagination. Gonzalo S. Paz noted that  
Hu Jintao has spent more time travelling in Latin America than Presi-
dent Bush, and many Latin American presidents – among them, Bra-
zil’s Lula da Silva, Argentina’s Nestor Kirchner, and Venezuela’s Hu-
go Chávez – have spent more time in Beijing than in Washington (Paz 
2006: 96).  
So far, China has signed three FTAs in Latin America: with Chile (in 
force since 2006), Peru (in force since 2010) and Costa Rica (signed in 
2011). 
The impact on the Latin American economies is contested. The 
mainstream view as presented by the OECD and other international 
organisations is that, with the exception of Mexico, Latin American ex-
ports are not significantly affected by Chinese competition due to the 
dissimilarity of the traded goods. At the same time, business organisa-
tions across the region maintain that China’s emergence as an economic 
powerhouse in Latin America poses a serious threat to their exports 
(Jenkins and Dussel Peters 2009: 9). A second concern is related to the 
region’s potential long-term dependence on a small number of commod-
ity exports. Chinese companies have secured a decade’s worth of oil 
from Venezuela and Brazil, and significant supplies of wheat, soybeans, 
natural gas and iron ore from Argentina. Under the terms of a 2 billion 
USD joint venture, agreed upon in 2005, China is guaranteed 836,250 
metric tonnes of Chilean copper over 15 years, at rates fixed to the 
(then) market price of 2.07 USD per pound. Considering that copper 
was trading above 4 USD per pound in 2011, China is getting copper at 
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far below market prices (James 2011). This trend toward a “primatisa-
tion” of Latin America’s exports to China spells the danger of a possible 
return of the centre–periphery trade pattern that has been at the core of 
scholarly and political discourses on the region since the 1940s (Jenkins 
and Dussel Peters 2009: 9-10).  
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*	
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While the reasons behind China’s economic interests toward Latin 
America are no mystery, (the interests are mainly driven by the need for 
a steady, and increasing, flow of commodities and raw materials to keep 
China’s economy growing), related political and geostrategic motives are 
harder to assess. June Teufel Dreyer (2006: 2) suggests that “Latin Amer-
ica and the Caribbean are crucial to the evolution of the world order that 
the Chinese leadership would like to see.” Do Latin American govern-
ments concur? According to some analysts, China is already being seri-
ously looked at as an “alternative diplomatic and economic partner to 
Washington” (Lanteigne 2009: 139, emphasis added). In this context, 
Manfred Mols (2010) differentiates three clusters in China’s bilateral 
relations with Latin America: strategic partners (Brazil, Mexico, Argenti-
na and Venezuela), cooperative partners (Chile, Peru and Cuba) and 
friendly-cooperative partners (Central America and the Caribbean).  
China’s open flirtation with its strategic partners, in terms of both 
political and economic relations, has the potential to challenge the Unit-
ed States. But so far China has not been interested in fully exploiting the 
potential that having closer relations with socialist, left-wing regimes – 
particularly in Venezuela but also in Bolivia and Ecuador – might have in 
terms of diminishing US power in the region. “China tacitly acquiesces 
to the Monroe Doctrine” (Camarena 2010: 47). Beijing’s rejection of 
Hugo Chávez’s advances is a case in point: Despite Chávez’s high-profile 
visit to China in 2006, the fact that approximately 20 per cent of Vene-
zuela’s oil exports are destined for China, and since Beijing announced 
that it would provide more than 32 billion USD in loans to the govern-
ment in Caracas, the PRC has been reluctant to hop onto the Venezue-
lan bandwagon of anti-American rhetoric. 
Obama’s Latin America tour of 2011 cannot cover for the fact that 
the Chinese presence in Latin America is not a high priority for Wash-
ington; China’s relations with the region have remained a minor issue 
because they lack sufficient strategic and political importance for the 
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United States. Washington’s perception might change soon, though, as 
there are already a number of factors that it is starting to become con-
cerned about. The US is mostly interested in supporting liberal and eco-
nomic orders and deepening economic integration between itself and 
Latin American countries. With regard to these core interests, the US is 
closely observing Sino-Latin American relations to understand whether 
China is disrupting the existing patterns of bi- and multilateralism. For 
the time being, however, China is not a firmly established power in Latin 
America, and Beijing’s rise on the continent is a relatively recent phe-
nomenon. 
Overall, there can be little doubt that particularly some of the left-
wing – and as it seems, by default, more Washington-critical – Latin 
American governments perceive a partnership with Beijing as a welcome 
means of soft-balancing or hedging against traditional US hegemony in 
the region. While Latin American governments may rightly complain 
about both a frequent lack of serious attention on the part of the United 
States and the latter’s rather narrowly defined national security interests 
in its relations with its hemispheric neighbours, why should they be in-
terested in replacing a decades-long dependency on the United States by 
a new dependency on China? Is there any convincing economic reason 
for Latin American countries to play the China card in an attempt to 
balance against the United States? China is an increasingly important 
factor in Latin America, but it is one among many. David Shambaugh 
(2008) accurately stresses that Latin American countries “embrace China 
as part of their new multidirectional diplomacy”. Multidirectional is the 
key word here. All Latin American governments have diversified their 
foreign relations. Their main interest is moderating US hegemony, not 
substituting it. As part of this strategy and particularly in times of eco-
nomic hardship such as in the wake of the global economic crisis of 
2008–09, every trade and investment opportunity is welcome. States in 
the era of globalisation are best described as rational opportunity maxi-
misers. This applies to Latin America as much as to East Asia; it is true 
for Vietnam or South Korea in the same way as for Peru or Mexico. The 
result of opportunity-maximising in Asia–Latin America relations is a 
growing and fast-tightening (but not yet deeply institutionalised) trans-
Pacific network comprising trade, investment, political and even security 
links in both bilateral and (increasingly) multilateral contexts. China is a 
founding member of the Forum for East Asia–Latin America Coopera-
tion (FEALAC), a permanent observer at the Organization of American 
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States (OAS) and has expanded its diplomatic ties to the Group of Rio, 
the Andean Community, and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). 
!,
A further indication of China’s increasing involvement in the multilater-
alisation and diversification of trans-Pacific international relations is its 
emergence as a donor country. In 2008, China joined the Inter-American 
Development Bank and committed 350 million USD to public and pri-
vate sector projects. Between 2002 and 2007, the combined values of 
“PRC aid and related investment projects” in the Western hemisphere 
amounted to 26.7 billion USD. Over two-thirds of these projects were in 
natural resource sectors, while 28 per cent were related to infrastructure 
and public works; only 1 per cent involved humanitarian activities and 
technical assistance, and 2 per cent of aid was unspecified.  
The emphasis on natural resources implies a strongly commercial na-
ture to China’s aid in Latin America, less oriented toward infrastruc-
ture development than China’s foreign assistance to Africa and 
Southeast Asia (Lum et al. 2009: 14).  
However, does the PRC’s growing role as a provider of Official Devel-
opment Assistance increase its attractiveness as a development model for 
Latin America? 
Much has been made recently of the emergence of a new Beijing 
Consensus and China model of development. Joseph Cooper Ramo has 
been a major proponent of the alternative road to development: 
The Beijing Consensus offers hope for the world. After the collapse 
of the Washington Consensus, the breakdown of WTO talks [and] the 
implosion of Argentina’s economy, much of the world was uncertain 
what a new paradigm for development ought to look like (Cooper 
Ramo 2004: 60). 
Generally speaking, the idea of the China model is very seductive and 
many authors – within the PRC as well as outside – have devoted con-
siderable efforts to trying to describe its contours (Zhang 2011).  Au-
thoritarianism and economic growth together are seen by some as 
somewhat unusual. Furthermore, social benefit that can be widespread 
without requiring a change in the social elite might be very attractive to 
all kinds of Latin American ruling classes (Chen and Goodman 2012).  
However, there is little or no agreement on what might constitute the 
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China model. For some, the China model is extreme neoliberalism (Har-
vey 2007; Halper 2010); for others, it means a high degree of state inter-
vention (Zhao 2010). When asked about the viability for other countries 
undertaking a China model of development, the premier of the PRC, 
Wen Jiabao, quite explicitly repudiated the idea: “It is not right to draw 
an analogy between China and other countries” (China Daily 2011: 4). His 
response came in the midst of a difficult political context, the Arab 
Spring of 2011. All the same, it is clear that two prerequisites of China’s 
dramatic success during the last three decades have been the scale of the 
country and the previous three decades of state socialism. These condi-
tions cannot be replicated, even in Latin America (Naughton 2010). 
There may be no China model for Latin America to emulate or to 
replace the apparently limited Washington Consensus with, but at the 
same time, China’s development over the last 30 years does offer some-
thing to Latin America. China has maintained stable government and 
become an international economic force within four decades of verging 
on being a pariah state. It has also become more of an independent voice 
in international affairs, especially vis-à-vis the US. In the process, China 
has tapped into a dominant discourse of modern nationalism: There has 
been a cultural shift designed to restore China’s place in the world.  
In 2007 the Brazilian ambassador to the PRC highlighted this aspect 
of international relations in an article in China’s leading Journal of Latin 
American Studies (De Castro Neves 2007: 9). To get an idea of China’s 
appeal, we need look no further than Mexico: All but in a trade war with 
the PRC for much of the last decade, the two countries’ political rela-
tionship is nonetheless very close in international forums such as the 
United Nations (Carrillo, Chen, and Goodman 2011: 442). 
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The ambiguities in the relationships between the PRC and the countries 
of Latin America are clearly demonstrated in the case studies that follow. 
The PRC presents both economic opportunities and challenges to the 
countries of Latin America. Concerns about dependency or indeed ex-
ploitation are never far from the surface, even when, as in the case of 
Mexico, the US may still loom larger in many ways in regional affairs.
Rhys Jenkins, in his study of Brazil’s relations with the PRC, high-
lights the problems that the countries of Latin America face. Increased 
economic interaction with the PRC has at least so far had a positive im-
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pact on the Brazilian economy. But it is the interpretation of the longer 
term that is cause for concern. As Jenkins points out, one must not see 
the economic interactions between China and any of the countries of 
Latin America only in bilateral terms. Chinese trade and investment are 
at the heart of the pressures and trends over the last two decades of 
globalisation. In evaluating the impact of China’s growth, it is necessary 
to look not only at the balance of trade and investment, but also at the 
bigger picture – namely, multilateral trade and international relations. 
From that perspective, carefully analysed here in Brazilian terms, it is 
clear that while China has positively impacted Brazil’s balance of trade, 
the impact of economic relations with the PRC may be of cause for 
greater concern. Involvement with the PRC has led to the restructuring 
of the Brazilian economy. Iron ore and soybean producers have benefit-
ted greatly, but there is otherwise evidence of de-industrialisation.   
In considering Mexico’s commercial relationship with the PRC, 
Roberto Hernández focuses on the remarkable contrasts between the 
two economies that have developed over the last three decades. Both 
countries have attempted to liberalise their economies over this period – 
though, in different ways, which the author suggests might well embody 
the competition between the Washington Consensus and a China model. 
Certainly the results could not have been more disparate, with China 
achieving 9 per cent per annum growth rates over these three decades, 
while Mexico’s economy has hardly grown at all. Unlike with Brazil, or 
indeed most other Latin American countries, there is no complementari-
ty between the PRC and Mexico, and indeed, as Hernández details, in 
Mexico there is a real fear of the “China threat” and of a trade war. This 
has been accentuated by the development of the WTO and also by the 
end of the ten-year moratorium on China trade into Mexico, which the 
latter made a condition of the former’s WTO entry. On the other hand, 
as Hernandez argues, this is not a battle that Mexico can win. What Mex-
ico needs is a change in its domestic policy along with a change in its 
attitude toward doing business with China that will allow it to take ad-
vantage of the opportunities in a multilateral world. 
In his discussion of Peru’s relations with the PRC, Ruben Gonzalez-
Vicente also argues that it is necessary to step beyond the perspective of 
bilateral economic relations if one is to understand the distribution of 
power in the world economic system and deal with questions of depend-
ency. In this case, though, the author’s focus is not on the multilateral 
relations of countries in Latin America so much as on China. The PRC is 
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not to be seen as a self-contained economy but rather as a location for 
transnational production. Following Harvey’s observations about inter-
national neoliberalism, Ruben Gonzalez-Vicente concludes that the poor 
in both countries are the losers of the process of globalisation. He argues 
that dependency in terms of bilateral relations is too simple a conclusion, 
even when, as in this case, the PRC buys primary products from Peru, 
invests in mining there, and sells manufactures into the local market. 
Chile’s relations with the PRC are more complex. A member of 
NAFTA, it has also been a major recipient of Chinese investment, espe-
cially in the copper-mining industry. In his analysis of Chile’s economic 
development and prospects as a result of its relationship with the PRC, 
Juan Carlos Gachuz highlights the tensions underlying these various 
processes. Chile has benefitted greatly from signing an FTA with the 
PRC, but if it is to continue growing it needs to develop exports in val-
ue-added products and in services. This is clearly not a unique feature of 
life for a Latin American economy under the impact of China’s growth: 
Like Mexico, Chile also needs a policy change within government and an 
attitude change amongst its entrepreneurs in order to boost both Chilean 
investment in China and trade and investment from the PRC into Chile. 
Adrian Hearn, in his examination of Cuba and its development under the 
impact of China’s economic growth, takes a markedly different ap-
proach. Of course the current economic and political environment in 
Cuba is markedly different than that of the rest of Latin America. Here is 
a country that has had (at least) three decades of something close to state 
socialism, though the scale of the country cannot match that of the PRC. 
Hearn’s approach is to try to understand the complexities and conun-
drums of an internationalising China often criticised for not adhering to 
international norms of economic behaviour elsewhere in Latin America, 
but which in this case is in fact encouraging Cuba to liberalise its eco-
nomic structures. The legitimacy for this action is paradoxically derived 
from the shared history of communist influence. And as Hearn empha-
sises, there is a double paradox in that the reformed PRC government 
not only retains influence over state corporations, but also has the power 
of the state in most internationally active enterprises. 
Last but not least, the contributions to this issue of the Journal of 
Current Chinese Affairs provide further empirical evidence of an observa-
tion made by the authors of a recent volume edited by Hearn and León-
Manríquez (2011): China’s relations have steadily been moving beyond 
economics to involve social, political and cultural interactions. 
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